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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALVIE PETERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ROYDON K. :McCULLOUGH, dha 
ROYDON K. ~lcCULLOUGH CO., 
Defendant and Appellant, 
vs. 
HENRY L. ASHTON, et al 
Third-party Defendants, and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 8298 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
The plaintiff herein brought this action for a breach 
of contract for the constructjon of a theater building at 
838 West North Temple Street in Salt Lake Cit~,, Ptah, 
against the defendant under ,a complaint filed on the 3rd 
day of December, 1951, which complaint was thereafter 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
amended and the second complaint filed on the 14th day 
of April, 1953, to which second amended complaint the 
defendant made answer. The third party defendants are 
sub-contractors, with the exception of the Beuhner Block 
Company, which supplied the building blocks in question 
for the construction of the said theatre building. On 
April 13th, 1950, the plaintiff went into possession of 
said building before the same was completed in accord-
ance with provisions of said contract, and thereafter 
commenced operation of said theatre (R-322, R-835). 
The Baid building contract provides for final payment to 
be made "Ten days after substantial completion of the 
work provided the work be then fully completed and the 
contract fully performed." (Pl). Final payment was made 
by the plaintiff at the time of taking possession of the 
building by is:suing to the defendant a Promissory Note 
in the sum of One Thousand Dollars ( $1,000.00). Said 
note was fully paid by the plaintiff to the defendant 
personally on l\tfarch 1st 1951 (R-837). 
The plaintiff being dissatisfied with the workman-
ship in the construetion of the building, .and the materials 
supplied, prote.sted to the defendant in January, 1950. 
That on or about January 7th, 1950, the plaintiff and 
the defendant entered into a memorandum agreement, 
written upon a letterhead of the defendant, in words and 
figures as follows : 
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Roydon K. :McCullough, Co. 
General Contractors and Engineers 
676 G Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
Phone El\1pire 3-2151 
:Mr. Alvie Peterson, 
1241 \Vhitlock Avenue, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Dear Sir: 
January 7th, 1950 
In accordance with our discussion with you and l\ir. 
Evans, your architect, .and as was verbally agreed at 
the meeting, we propose to thoroughly point up and fill 
all masonry joint.s in the exterior of the hollow block 
masonry work on your theatre at 838 West North Temple 
Street. We also propose to paint these walls with a 
he·avy coat of lead and oil paint. 
This work is to be done in full compensation for 
our failure to install certain items of steel in the hollow 
block pilaster walls, in a satisfactory manner, also, for 
our failure to fill pilaster cores with cement mortar, and 
to completely bed vertical block joints as shown and 
specified. 
Accepted: Alvie Peterson 
Date: 1/10/50. (R-253) 
Henry L. Ashton 
Roydon K. McCullough 
The plaintiff has contended throughout the trial of 
this case that memorandum agreement, above set out, 
was never performed or kept by the defendant, Roydon 
K. McCullough, nor by his subcontractor, Henry L. 
Ashton, and that the work was never completed in a 
satisfactory 1nanner as agreed upon. After the above 
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agreement was signed by the parties, as set forth, the 
defendant and his subcontractor proceeded with the con-
struction of the theatre building. It is admitted that the 
plaintiff visited the .site where the building was being 
constructed approximately twice a day and observed 
the work there being carried on by the defendant and 
his subcontractors, but did not inspect the same. It is 
true that the plaintiff chose the color of the paint to be 
used and was present when at least part of the w.all was 
being painted, but took no part in the direction or man-
agement of the work of the defendaTIJt or hi.s subcontrac-
tors. On or about November 3rd, 1949, the defendant and 
Henry L. Ashton, entered into a subcontract, and pursu-
ant thereto the s.aid Henry L. Ashton agreed to do the 
m:asonry work for said building in accordance with the 
plans and specifications of the original contract entered 
into by and between the plaintiff .and defendant (R-156 
to 162 inclusive). On or about November 3rd, 1949, the 
defendant entered into a subcontract with William A. 
Earl and William A. Earl, Jr., dba William A. Earl & 
Son, Plastering Contractors, wherein and whereby the 
said vVilliam A. Earl and vVilliam A. Earl, Jr. agreed to 
do the lathing and plastering of said building in accord-
ance with the plans and specifications of the original 
contract entered into by and between the plaintiff and 
the defendant (R-83-151). 
A Second Amended Complaint of the plaintiff was 
filed on April 14th, 1953, in the above named court 
(R-109 to 112), the plaintiff alleging among other things, 
that he had duly fulfilled all the conditions of the con-
tract on his part to be performed, and that the defendant, 
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Roydon I<:. ~icCullough had not, but on the contr,ary 
failed to complete the erection of the said building, and 
that portion which was erected was done in an unskill-
full and negligent manner, and used in the construction 
of .said building unsuitable and inferior materials. That 
on or about the 1st day of July, 1951, cracks were 
observed in the interior walls of said building. That 
on or about the 1st day of July, 1951, the roof developed 
leaks, and the plaster fell within the interior from the 
walls and ceilings, and that the building cracked, becan1e 
dirty and untentable. 
The plaintiff further alleged that he had been 
damaged in certain items ,set forth in said second 
amended complaint in the total sum of $60,000.00, because 
of f.aulty construction and lack of compliance with the 
contract in the use of suitable and proper materials 
in accordance with the plans and specifications for the 
construction of said building. 
The issues having been joined a trial wa.s had on the 
case, commencing on the 8th day of February 1 ~):5+, and 
extending until the 4th day of March 1954. 
Findings of Fact were signed by the court on the Gth 
day of October, 1954. The court finding that the plaintiff 
had duly fulfilled all the conditions of the contract on his 
part to be fulfilled and that the defendant had not, to 
the damage of the plaintiff, as a conclusion of law, as 
follows: 
1. For damages arising by reason of defective ma-
terial.s and work done in roofing the building, damage to 
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drapes, wood work, equipment, etc., the plaintiff is 
entitled to the sum of $1,000.00. 
2. For the expense and cost to repair the roof, or 
reroof the building the plaintiff is entitled to the sum of 
$1,500.00. 
3. As damages for the use of building stone and 
cinder blocks different from that provided by the con-
tr.act, and for the lack of mortar in the masonry work, 
and the defective plaster, requiring replastering of said 
building, the plaintiff is entitled to the sum of $5,300.00. 
4. For damages to the cement floor the plaintiff is 
entitled to the sum of $300.00. 
5. For loss of revenue during the time the building 
will be under repair the plaintiff is entitled to the sum 
of $121.26. 
6. For damages for the removal and storage and 
replacement of equipment during the time the building 
will be under repair the plaintiff is entitled to the .sum 
of $350.00. 
7. The plaintiff is entitled to his costs herein. 
l\1aking a total judgment of $9,507.66, which judgment 
was duly made .and entered by the court on the 6th day 
of October, 1954, awarding such judgment to the plaintiff 
against Roydon K. McCullough, dba Roydon K. McCul-
lough Company, together with the plaintiff's costs and 
disbursements incurred in the pro.secution of the action. 
The third party defendants, to-wit: Henry L. Ash-
ton; Buehner Block Comp.any, a Utah Corporation; L. E. 
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Lambert, dba Lambert Roofing Company; William A. 
Earl and William A. Earl, Jr., dha William A. Earl & 
Son, Plastering Contractors, as third p.arty defendants 
were brought into the case by Roydon K. :McCullough, 
dba Roydon K. McCullough Company, third party plain-
tiff, under actions filed against each of the said third 
party defendants. The .actions, during the course of the 
trial, were duly dismissed against the Buehner Block Co., 
L. E. Lambert Roofing Company, and William A. Earl 
& Son, Plastering Contractors. The action against Henry 
L. Ashton was not dismissed. 
On October 13th, 1954, defendant and third party 
plaintiff filed with the above court a motion for a new 
trial as to all of the parties and as to all of the issues 
involved in the action (R-196). 
On October 29th, 1954, the defendant and third party 
plaintiff filed with the court another motion to vacate 
the findings and conclusions and judgment of the plain-
tiff, Peterson, signed on the 6th of October, 1954 (R-198, 
200). 
On the 9th day of November, 1954, a hearing ·was had 
upon the defendant's and third party plaintiff's fore-
going motions, and on the 12th day of November, 1954, 
the court signed an order denying the motion to set aside 
the findings, conclu.sions, and judgments of the Plaintiff, 
Peterson, and the third party defendant, Earl, also deny-
ing a motion for a new trial, and giving third party 
defendant, Ashton, Until November 19th, 1954, to file 
findings, conclusions and judgment. Otherwise, defend-
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ant could do it for him. Plaintiff's judgment was also 
corrected to the total amount of $9,571.26. Said order 
of the court was filed of record November 16th, 1954 
(R-201-203). 
Notice of Appeal was filed December 8th 1954 by 
' ' . defendant, 1\1cCullough, appealing from the judgment 
and order of the trial court (R-211-212). On December 
13th, 1954, the court filed for record the findings and 
conclusions :and judgment of the third party defendant, 
Buehner Block Company (R-213-218). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point I. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
THE DEFENDANT USED A BUILDING STONE AND 
CINDER BLOCK DIFFERENT THAN THAT PROVIDED IN 
THE CONTRACT, AND DID NOT ERR IN FURTHER FIND-
ING THAT THE PLAINTIFF, PETERSON, HAD NOT 
Vf AIVED THE RIGHTS HE HAD WITH REFERENCE TO 
THE BLOCKS USED IN SAID THEATRE BY NOT OBJECT-
ING TO THEIR USE AFTER KNOWING OF THE SAME. 
Point II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING DAMAGES 
TO THE PLAINTIFF, PETERSON, WITH REFERENCE TO 
A LACK OF MORTAR IN THE MASONRY IN THE CON-
STRUCTION OF SAID BUILDING, AND THE PLAINTIFF 
DID NOT WAIVE ANY RIGHTS TO SUCH DAMAGES, EX-
PRESSLY OR BY IMPLICATION. 
Point III. 
THE PLAINTIFF, PETERSON, BY TAKING POSSESSION 
OF SAID BUILDING, PAYING THE CONTRACT PRICE, AND 
MAKING NO OBJECTION TO MATERIAL USED, AND THE 
MANNER OF ~CONSTRUCTION, DID NOT WAIVE ANY 
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RIGHTS HE HAD TO DAMAGES, AND IS NOT ESTOPPED 
FROM ASSERTING THE SAME, AND IT WAS NOT ERROR 
FOR THE LOVIER COURT TO AWARD SUCH DAMAGES. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
THE DEFENDANT USED A BUILDING STONE AND 
CINDER BLOCK DIFFERENT THAN THAT PROVIDED IN 
THE CONTRACT, AND DID NOT ERR IN FURTHER FIND-
ING THAT THE PLAINTIFF, PETERSON, HAD NOT 
WAIVED THE RIGHTS HE HAD WITH REFERENCE TO 
THE BLOCKS USED IN SAID THEATRE BY NOT OBJECT-
ING TO THEIR USE AFTER KNOWING OF THE SAME. 
Under the arguments set forth in the defendant's 
Brief he supports his argument that the plaintiff has 
waived his rights to damages accuring under Point One, 
Two and Four of His Brief, h;,' references to certain au-
thorities, which will be treated separately and consecu-
tively, to-wit: 
17 Corpus Juris Secundum, Page 1100. Contracts-
par. 415 b, Building and Construction Contracts. 
Use. 
No. 2 under same paragraph, topic Occupancy or 
Birch Electrical, etc., Laboratories vs. Gar-
butt, 110 P 140, 13 California Appeals, 435; 
Morgan v.s. Plotkin, 189 N.W. 63, 219 Michi-
gan 265; 
Larson vs. Knight, .a Utah Case, 233 P 2d, 
365; 
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Rehr vs. West, 76 N.E. 2d, 808, 311 Ill. App. 
160; 
Leonard vs. Home Builders, 161 P 1151, 174 
Cal. 65. 
It is the contention of the defendant, McCullough~ 
that the building stone and cinder blocks complied in 
every respect to the requirements of the plan.s and 
specifications of the contract between the plaintiff and 
the defendant. 
Article 9 of the contract provides : R-12. 
"Unless otherwise specified, all materials shall be 
new and both workmanship and materials shall be of 
good quality." The plaintiff contends that the plans and 
specifications relating to hollow concrete masonry units 
to be used in the theatre building must be viewed in the 
light of this provision of the contract, .and when so viewed 
the building blocks used by the defendant and his sub-
contractor did not meet the requirements of said contract 
or the plans and specification.s forming a part thereof, as 
they were not finished or cured (R-458 line 23 etc. and 
460-461). While the specific provision in said plans and 
specifications relating to the kind of building blocks to 
be u.sed, is silent as to whether or not the blocks should 
be finished or cured, yet in order to meet the provisions 
of Article 9 above setforth, they must be both new and of 
good quality. They may have been new but were not 
of good quality as they shrunk after being placed in the 
walls (R-459-460-461). Mr. Driggs, ·a licensed and prac-
tising research engineer testified that "the cracks in the 
plaster are definitely due to the shrinkage of the blocks." 
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(R-462 and 463). The tenn "good quality" means of such 
quality as to be reasonably suited to meet the demand and 
requirements of the customer, or as here, the owner of 
the building. 
Shawnee Gas & Electric Co. vs. Corporation 
Commission of Oklahoma, 237 Pac. 838-843, 
111 Oakla. 6. 
"Where the buyer, expressly or by implica-
tion, make.s known to the seller, the particular 
purpose for which the goods are required so as to 
show the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judg-
ment (r) the goods shall be reasonably fit for the 
purpose." 
Chitty on Contracts, 7th Edition, Section 13, ( r), 
Page 431. 
In the case as bar, the plaintiff relied upon the de-
fendant, :McCullough to furnish building blocks which 
would be of good quality and reasonably adapted to the 
objects and purposes for which they were to be used. It is 
only reasonable to construe the provision of the plans 
and specifications relating to the ''Hollow concrete 
masonry units" to be used in the construction of the 
building in the light of Article 9, of the Contra~·t and 
that they would be of ~uch quality as not to shri11k after 
being placed in the walls (R.458). The plaintiff did not 
contract with the defendant for blocks which wore not 
cured and ·which would shrink and h)T so using, leave 
cracks in the walls, causing the plaster of the interior 
walls to crack, leak and leave .apertures for the elements 
to come through. Obviously, that would not effectuate the 
purposes of the building contract. What reasonable 
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person would contract for the construction of a theater 
building to be made of blocks which might technically 
meet A.S. T .l\L standards, but which were neither cured 
nor finished (R-459, 460 and 461). l\1:oreover, the defend-
ant used three different blocks of different compositions 
(R-398, 401 and 407), with obviously three different co-
efficients of expansion and contraction, resulting in a lack 
of uniformity in wall composition and expansion and con-
traction. The defendant therefore, has not met the re-
quirement.s of the contract in the use of building blocks 
.as agreed, and the finding of the trial court that he used 
blocks "different and defective" than those c.alled for 
should be sustained. (Par. 5, sub-section 3 of Findings of 
Fact, R-191.) 
An extended discussion of this matter was had at 
the trial (R-403-464). It is the contention of the plaintiff 
that the findings of the court in this regard cannot now 
be disturbed under the evidence produced in this case. 
In the Case of Rino vs. Statewide Pl'ltmbing & Heat-
ing Cornpany, Inc., an Idaho Case, 1953,262 Pac. 2d, 1003, 
the court held that in an action for breach of contract 
to design and install an adequate heating plant, findings 
of the jury that inadequate operation was due to faulty 
design, construction and installation, was su.stained by 
the ·evidence. Findings based on substantial though con-
fleeting evidence will not be disturbed. 
In Yowell vs. The Occidential Life Insurance Com-
pany, a Ut,ah Case, 110 Pac. 2d, 566, the court held where 
the trial court's findings of fact is ba.sed upon sufficient 
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evidence, the Supreme Court will not reverse it, even if 
inclined to arrive at a different conclusion than the trial 
judge. 
In Beckstead vs. Brittan, 142 Pac. 2d 409, a Utah 
Case, this court has said that: the Supreme Court would 
not disturb the trial court's findings where the evidence 
was in direct conflict. 
In TuJt vs. Brotherson, 150 Pac. 2d 384, the Utah 
Supr.eme Court said: "Where there is evidence to sup-
port trial court's findings in an action at law they will 
not be upset on appe.al. On appeal the Supreme Court 
is bound by trial court's fact finding fairly supported by 
evidence. 
Cahoon vs. Universal Credit Co., 146 Pac. 2d, 284 
in re Knight's Estate, 141 Pac. 2d, 879. 
In Staley vs. Grant, 276 Pac. 2d 489, 2 Utah 2nd 421, 
the Supreme Court has .said: "On conflicting matters the 
evidence is to be viewed in .a light rnost favorable to the 
party for whom the judgn1ent was entered, and \vhen so 
viewed, if there is evidence supporting the judgment, it 
will not be disturbed." 
In Miller vs. Ziedrich, 263 Pac. 2d, 611-199 Oregon 
505, the Supreme Court of the State said: "The Supreme 
Court is without .authority to disturb Circuit Court's de-
cision of fact question on conflicting evidence in action at 
l.aw." 
There is little question but what this is the general 
rule prevailing in the State of Utah, and in practically 
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all the States of the Union. So the contention of the de-
fendant, McCullough, that the building stone and cinder 
blocks used in the erection of the theatre in question 
complied in every respect to the requirements of the 
plans and specifications of the contract between the 
plaintiff :and defendant has been resolved by the trial 
court against such contention, and the finding of such 
trial court should not be di.sturbed 
The above rule is applicable to the Findings of Fact 
of the court as set forth in its findings, found on pages 
191 and 192 of the record. 
Point II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING DAMAGES 
TO THE PLAINTIFF, PETERSON, WITH REFERENCE TO 
A LACK OF MORTAR IN THE MASONRY IN THE CON-
STRUCTION OF SAID BUILDING, AND THE PLAINTIFF 
DID NOT WAIVE ANY RIGHTS TO SUCH DAMAGES, EX-
PRESSLY OR BY IMPLICATION. 
The defendant contends that the plaintiff waived his 
rights he might have had, with reference to the court's 
findings of lack of mortar in the masonry, and it was 
error. for the lower court to award damages for the .same. 
The defendant's contention is based principally upon the 
conduct of the plaintiff, and the fact that on the 7th day 
of January, 1950, he signed and accepted the provisions 
in a letter from Henry L. Ashton and Roydon K. McCul-
lough in which they agreed to do certain work, which had 
theretofore been performed in a negligent and unskillful 
manner. The letter is an adn1ission on their p;art of the 
unsatisfactory way in which the building had been con-
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structed. The fact that the contents of the letter was 
accepted by the plaintiff constitutes no waiver under the 
original agreement for the contractor to proceed in a 
workmanlike way with the construction of the building 
and in accordance with the plans and specifications of 
the original contract. As a matter of fact the contents of 
the letter were never performed as agreed to by Henry 
L. Ashton and Roydon K. :McCullough, and in no way 
released Roydon K. McCullough . from his agreement 
signed ·with the plaintiff on November 2nd, 1949. 
The defendant further contends that because of the 
conduct of the plaintiff that he waived any rights to 
damages for the defective work mentioned under Point I I 
of the defendant's Brief, claiming that because he selected 
the color for the paint to be used on the interior walls, 
.and visited the premises on an average of twice a day 
during the construction, and failed to object to the 
manner in which the building was being constructed, or 
to the materials used, ha.s waived his rights to damages. 
The defendant cites in substantiation of his position 
17 Corpus Juris Secundum, Page 1100, Contracts, Para-
graph 5b, Building and Contruction contracts: 
"An acceptance of the work of structure, as 
in compliance with the contract, will ordinarily 
constitute a waiver of a full performance of de-
fective performance of a building contract, and 
such acceptance may be expressed or implied 
from the conduct of the owner. Whether or not 
his acts amount to an acceptance is generally a 
question of fact depending on all the circum-
st~ances of the case. Thus, although particular 
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circumstances in a given case may require a dif-
ferent holding, some of the defects may be waived 
by the owner's failing to object thereto at the 
proper time, and specifically calling the builder's 
attention to other defects; but .a waiver of one 
defect is not a waiver of other defects. 
"So, where the work or materials is under 
the inspection of the owner or his architect dur-
ing its progress, if the builder is not complying 
with the contract, it is the duty of the owner or 
architect to object to such work or materials as 
obviously do not comply with the contract, and on 
hi.s failure to do so the owner cannot, after the 
work is completed, claim that the work or ma-
terials was not in accordance with the contract, 
but this rule does not apply where the contract 
contains a provision to the contrary, where the 
owner was not required to inspect the building 
day by day and had no inspector constantly on 
the job, or where the defects were hidden and not 
discovered until after completion of the work. So, 
mere presence of t~e owner during the construc-
tion period without assuming to direct the work 
does not constitute a waiver." (Italics ours.) 
It is the contention of the plaintiff that he did not 
inspect the work, although he was present an average of 
twice per day at the place where the theatre was being 
constructed. 
It is evident that what provoked the letter from 
Henry L. Ashton and Roydon K. l\IcCullough to the plain-
tiff, dated January 7th, 1950, was that a protest had 
been made by the plaintiff on ce·rtain iten1s of the work 
and con.struction thereof, as can be seen from a pe·rusal 
of said letter. Here the owner was not required to inspect 
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the building day by day, and had no inspector on the 
job for that purpose. J\ioreover, most of the defects were 
hidden and not discovered until after the alleged com-
pletion of the building. So his mere presence during the 
construction period, without ,assuming to direct the work, 
which he did not do, does not consitute a waiver. 
in the Case of Otto JJ;Jisch Co. vs. E. E. Davis Co., 217 
N".W. 38, 40; 241 :Michigan 285, the court said: "Permit-
ting contractors to continue work after protest by archi-
tect that specifications were not complied with was not 
a vvaiver of compliance or guaranty." 
In Rice vs. Plattesburg-Vibbard Coal Mining Com-
pany, 229 S.W. 298, the Court held: "vVhere plaintiff 
contracted with the defendant to dig a mine shaft, de-
fendant to furnish timbers to be used in curbing and 
blocking the same, .and plaintiff protested when the de-
fendant furnished un.suitable material, plaintiff's use 
of the materials furnished did not constitute an accept-
ance of them." 
"Nor does an acceptance constitute a waiver of latent 
defects of which the owner was ignorant of at the time.'" 
Town of Tonawanda vs. Stapell, Mumm & Beals 
Corp., 270 N.Y.S. 377. 240 App. Div. 472. City of Sea-
side vs. Randalls, 180 Pac. 319. Rouge River Fruit & 
Produce Association vs. Gillen-Chambers Co., 165 Pac. 
679-85 Oregon, 113. Rehearing denied, Hi5 Pac. 1183. 
The court has said in the case of Sidney Stevens Im-
plement Co. vs. Hintze, 67 Pac. 2d, 632, a Utah Case, 
paragraph 4, page 637 of the Report: "It is argued that 
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the defendant supervised the construction of the trailer 
' and was present for that purpose several days a week. So 
far as we are able to discover from the evidence, defend-
ant .always relied upon the skill and experience of the 
plaintiff's workmen, and while present and exhibiting an 
interest in the progress of the work and suggesting 
changes, he did not a.ssume to direct the work or impose 
his judgment as to structuDal requirements. Certainly, 
the fract that the trailer, when completed, '\Veighed ap-
proximately double the .agreed weight, cannot he ascribed 
to anything that the defendant did or suggested in the 
construction of it. Nor do we see how his being present 
and seeing the work progress can have the effect of a 
waiver on his part of the weight agreed upon." The 
judgment for the defendant in the lower court was 
affirmed. 
The defendant cites in support of his contention 
Birch Electrical, etc. Laboratories vs. Garbutt, 110 P.140, 
13 Cal. A pp. 435. This case is not in point. The defendant 
had a supervisor on the job and directed the work him-
self, as witness the testin1ony of Sirch found on page 
141 of the Report: "The witnes.s, Sirch, also testified that 
the defendant personally directed the designing, the 
placing of the conduits, and their quality, .and passed 
upon every step as the work progressed, ineluding the 
wiring of the circuits, and how they would have to be, 
and the location of eaeh piece of machinery. He in-
structed what he wanted there, and I did what he said." 
In this case the defendant had been on the job t'\Yo or 
three hour.s per day, seven days per week, and with his 
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supervisor to supervise and direct the construction of 
the work. In the case at bar, Peterson, while visiting the 
place perhaps twice daily, did not have a supervisor to 
direct the work nor did he, himself, direct the work or 
supervise the construction, but trusted entirely to the 
skill and worlrmanship of the contractor .and his em-
ployees. In the Sirch Case the court said "The court 
further finds that in respect to the counterclaim of the 
defendant against the plaintiff, any damage suffered by 
reason of the nonperformance of s.aid contract by the 
plaintiff has been waived by reason of the defendant, with 
full knowledge of said facts, having paid and accepted 
said work." Which finding was by the trial court and 
affirn1ed by the court on appeal. In the case at bar the 
plaintiff, Peterson, was not in full knowledge of the 
defects as many of them were latent and did not come 
to light until a year or so after the work had been paid 
for and he had gone into possession of the building. 
The defendant also cites Morgan v~. Plotkin, 189 
~~.W. 63, 219 :Mich. 265, in support of his contention. 
This c.ase is also not in point because the defendant had 
a plumber on the job who was in charge of the work and 
gave the contractor instructions, and also with the de-
fendant's knowledge while the work progres.sed before 
the underground returns were covered. In paragraph 2, 
page 64 of the report, the court Bays: 
"Plaintiff's evidence showed that he faithfully 
completed his contact as closely as conditions per-
mitted, with two exceptions, and did some extra 
work because of repairs and changes, for which 
he made no charge." 
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"The first, as he testified, was failure to 
cover the little heater he went there to see about 
" "bl ' poss1 y a week" or longer after they quit, which 
was not there when his men had otherwise finished 
the job and left; the second being that he did not 
encase the underground returns in crock a.s speci-
fied, but instead applied a thick insulated cover-
ing protected by a roofing and asphalt-jacket, 
which he claimed was the customary method in 
such cases, and better than the method specified 
by the architect in his contract, which simply 
called for crock, with no provision for filling and 
sealing the joint.s. He testified that this change 
was made with the approval of a steam fitter and 
plumber, named Applebaum, who was in charge 
of the work and gave him instructions, and also 
with the defendant's lmowledge, while the work 
progressed, before the underground returns were 
covered." 
In the case at Bar, as above mentioned, the plaintiff, 
Peterson, had no supervisor, or other person on the job 
to direct the construction of the work, nor did he him-
self direct or supervise said construction. 
In Sullivan vs. Beneficial Life Insurance Co., 91 Utah 
405, 64 Pac. 2d, 351, this court held: 
"Party should not be charged with waiver of a 
forfeiture· in the absence of knowledge of condi-
tions existing." 
The defendant also cites in support of his contention 
that there was a waiver on the part of the plaintiff to 
damages, the ease of Larson vs. Knight, Utah Case, 233 
Pac. 2d, 565, 372, where the court made this staten1ent: 
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"Do these circumstances show such a situation 
and such co.nduct on the part of the plaintiffs as 
to justify the trial court's conclusion that the de-
fendant was excused from his promise to install 
the ski tow~ Do they amount to a waiver or 
estoppel~ vV e believe they do. A party claiming 
a right ought not to appear to acquiesce in non-
performance by the other party until the time has 
gone by for such performance .and then claim 
damages." 
This case is not in point. Knight sold the "Ski Inn" in 
P.arley's Canyon, located approximately 18 miles East of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, to the plaintiffs, .and agreed at 
the same time to install a ski tow. The plaintiffs became 
in arrears upon the payxnent of rent and installments upon 
the contract. On August 27th, 1948, the defendant noti-
fied the plaintiffs he would not install the ski tow unless 
they performed their part of the agreement and p.aid 
the rent in the amount of $250.00, and insurance 
premiums \vhich had not been paid, and which were then 
in arrears. Some negotations for the sale of the property 
were then carried on by both parties, and finally the 
defendant took possession, the trial court finding that 
he had a right to so do. The court further held that the 
plaintiffs had led the defendant to believe that he would 
not be obligated to install the ski tow by conduct .and 
acquiescence on their part by their failure to perform 
their part of the agreement. No similar situation aro.se in 
the case at bar. No where has the plaintiff in this c.ase 
led the defendant to believe that he acquiesed or con-
sented to the inferior materials used in the construction 
of the theatre building, or the negligent and unworkman-
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like manner in which it was constructed, relying entirely 
throughout the performance of the contract on the 
part of the defendant to comply with the contract and 
construct the building and use materials in accordance 
with the plans and specifications. At no time did he 
notify the defendant that the contract was terminated 
because of the inferior materials used, or on account of 
the manner of construction. The two cases are entirely 
dissimilar. The case cited is no,t analagous to the case 
before the court, as the plaintiff's claim for most of the 
damages are for defects in workmanship, construction 
and materials used, which did not becmne evident until 
sometime after the payment of the contract price and 
occupancy by him. Hence, the rule laid down in the 
Larson vs. Knight ca.se, to-wit: 
"a party claiming a right ought not to appear to 
acquiesce in nonperformance by the other party 
until the time has gone by for such performance 
and then claim damages," 
is not applicable in the case under consideration. 
Point III. 
THE PLAINTIFF, PETERSON, BY TAKING POSSESSION 
OF SAID BUILDING, PAYING THE CONTRACT PRICE, AND 
MAKING NO OBJECTION TO MATERIAL USED, AND THE 
MANNER OF CONSTRUCTION, DID NOT WAIVE ANY 
RIGHTS HE HAD TO DAMAGES, AND IS NOT ESTOPPED 
FROM ASSERTING THE SAME, AND IT WAS NOT ERROR 
FOR THE LOWER COURT TO AWARD SUCH DAMAGES. 
In the Case of Van Banducci vs. FrankL. Hickey, 
Inc., a California Cas.e, 209 Pac. 2d, 398, the court said: 
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"Mere acceptance of completed work under 
land leveling contract did not necessarily preclude 
land owner from recovering damages for breach 
of contract on ground that the work was done in 
an unworkmanlike manner, particularly where the 
defects were latent or the owner had no reason-
able me.ans of ascertaining such defects, and, 
when ascertained, gave timely notice thereof even 
though the owner had paid the contract price." 
In the Case of Sparl,ing vs. Hmtsman, 214 Pac. 2d, 
837, a California Case the Court said: 
"Where a contract is made with owner of 
realty to erect a building on the realty .and there is 
a breach by the builder of his covenant to build in 
a good and workmanlike manner, neither occupa-
tion by the owner, after its supposed completion, 
nor payment of the price, though .accompanied by 
knowledge by the owner of defective construction, 
is sufficient, taken alone, to operate as a 
waiver or breach of covenant." 
In the Case of the Board of Education of Salt Lake 
City vs. vVest et al G-ulbranson, Intervenor, 186 Pac. 114, 
55, Utah, 357. On page 118 of the report the court said: 
"Nor do we think there was any waiver, under 
the circumstances, on the p.art of Con West by 
reason of the $700.00 payment made by him to the 
appellant to apply on the contract price. The 
testimony is clear and convincing that the pay-
ment was made, as the trial court finds, before 
knowledge that the materials used were inferior 
and not in substantial compliance with the speci-
fications and contract." 
In the Case of Rehr vs. West, 76 N.E. 2d, 808, 333 
Ill. Appeals, 160 cited by the defendant in support of his 
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e,ontention that the plaintiff had waived his right to 
damages is against such contention as the court s.aid in 
that case: 
"The acceptance by owner of cement floor 
constructed by contractor and the payment there-
for constituted a waiver of all visible defects, or 
such as could he ascertained by inspection and ex-
amination but was not a waiver of .latent defects." 
(Italics ours.) 
The damages allowed by the trial court as Con-
clusions of Law were as follows : 
1. For damages arising by reason of defective ma-
terial and work done in roofing the building, damage to 
drapes, woodwork, equipn1ent, etc. The plaintiff is 
entitled to the su1n of $1,000.00. 
2. For the expense and cost to repair the roof, or 
re-roof the building the plaintiff is entitled to the smn 
of $1,500.00. 
3. As damages for the use of the building stone and 
cinder blocks different than that provided by the con-
tract, and for lack of n1ortar in masonry work and defec-
tive plast<er requiring the re-plastering of said building 
the plaintiff is entitled to the sum of $6,300.00. 
4. For damages to the cement floors the plaintiff 
is entitled to the sum of $300.00. 
The aforefoing damages .awarded by the trial court 
to the plaintiff were for defects in construction and 
inferior materials used the-rein which were dise,overed 
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after the contract price had been paid by the plaintiff, 
and possession of the building had be,en taken. At the 
time the contraet price was fully paid and the building 
occupied, the defects had not appeared, and therefore 
were, at that time, latent and hidden defects, but under 
the weight of authority though he had knowledge of 
such defects at the time payment was made and posses-
sion taken, such payrnent and possession would not 
constitute a waiver of his rights to recover damages for 
defective workmanship and inferior materials used, and 
the non-compliance with the contract. 
In the Case at bar the plaintiff relied entirely upon 
the experience, workrnanship and integrity of the con-
tractor, to construct the building in a workmanlike man-
ner, and to use materials called for in the contract, 
plans and specifications. In the case just cited, Rehr vs. 
West the court held: 
"That a contractor who contracts to construct 
a cement floor impliedly warrants that the work 
will be performed in a good and workmanlike 
manner." 
The Case of Leonard vs. I-Iomebuilders, 17-1- Cal. 65, 
161 Pac. 1151, cited by the defendant in support of his 
contention that payment by the plaintiff was waiver of 
his rights to damages is also a case against the defendant 
and not in his favor. In this case the defendant and 
plaintiff executed an agreement in writing for the con-
struction of a house. The plaintiff performed his part of 
the agreement with full knowledge of the defective work-
manship, and of inferior materials used. The fact of 
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his making payment in accordance with his agreement on 
the contract and entering into possession with full knowl-
edge of the defects, of con.struction and materials used 
did not operate as a waiver of his rights for damages. 
The court said in the last paragr.a ph of the report, on 
page 1153: 
"He (the plaintiff) was, not in a safe position 
to refuse payment on the ground that his un-
liquidated damages would be sufficient to defeat 
or extinguish his fixed liability for the install-
ments of the contract. While this was not legal 
duress or compulsion it is strong evidence against 
the proposition that payment in full was a waiver. 
The motion for non-suit should have been denied." 
In this ease the lower court granted the defendant 
a non-suit on the grounds that the plaintiff had waived 
his rights to damages for defective work and inferior 
rna terials u.sed in the construction of the house because 
of his payment in full as required by the contract, and 
going into possession with full knowledge of such defects 
of construction and inferior materials used, which motion 
by the defendant the Appellate court held should have 
been denied. The court in this case quoted the ~arne 
ruling as vv.as given in Sparling vs. I-Iousemo.n, abov0 
cited. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons cited by the plaintiff he 
contends that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, made and entered by the trial court, were just and 
proper and should not now be disturbed by thi~ court. 
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That the m,atters set forth in the defendant's Brief, under 
Points 3 and 5 are not pertinent to the plaintiff's case, 
and are matters which are not involved in his case, and 
not pertinent for him to answer or reply to. The other 
points in defendant's Brief, and replied to in this Brief 
clearly .show that the judgment of the trial court should 
be affirmed. We therefore respectfully conclude and sub-
mit for consideration of this court, and that the judgment 
of the court below should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN S. HATCH 
DEAN E. FLANDERS 
A.M. MARSDEN 
Attorneys for the Respondent 
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